Shamoon is a type of destructive malware that has been previously associated with attacks against the Saudi Arabian energy sector we’ve been tracking since 2012. We’ve observed that a variant of Shamoon, identified as Shamoon 2, has recently been used against several compromised organizations and institutions. Talos is aware of the recent increase in Shamoon 2 activity and has responded to ensure our customers are protected. Additionally, Talos will continue to monitor for new developments to ensure our customers remain protected.
Shamoon 2 has been observed targeting very specific organizations and propagating within a network via network enumeration and the use of stolen credentials. Some of the credentials are organization specific from individuals or shared accounts. Other credentials are the default accounts of products used by the targeted customers.
The few last days, a malware sample named EyePyramid has received considerable attention, especially in Italy. The Italian police have arrested two suspects and also published a preliminary report of the investigation. This malware is notable due to the targeting of Italian celebrities and politicians.
We conducted our analysis on one of the first public samples attributed to EyePyramid. Sources in the security community have described this malware campaign as unsophisticated, and the malware samples involved as uninteresting. However Talos was intrigued to determine just how EyePyramid managed to stay hidden under-the-radar for years.
Talos has identified a malicious Microsoft Word document with several unusual features and an advanced workflow, performing reconnaissance on the targeted system to avoid sandbox detection and virtual analysis, as well as exploitation from a non-embedded Flash payload. This document targeted NATO members in a campaign during the Christmas and New Year holiday. Due to the file name, Talos researchers assume that the document targeted NATO members governments. This attack is also notable because the payload was swapped out with a large amount of junk data which was designed to create resource issues for some simplistic security devices.
Talos is disclosing TALOS-2016-0259 / CVE-2016-8710. An exploitable heap write out of bounds vulnerability exists in the decoding of BPG images in libbpg library. A crafted BPG image decoded by libbpg can cause an integer underflow vulnerability causing an out of bounds heap write leading to remote code execution. This vulnerability can be triggered via attempting to decode a crafted BPG image using libbpg.
BPG (Better Portable Graphics) is an image format created in 2014 based on the HECV video compression standard. BPG has been praised for its ability to produce the same quality image as the well known JPEG format, but in a much smaller file size. Talos is disclosing the presence of a remote code execution vulnerability in the libbpg library which is widely used to support the file format. During the decoding of a BPG, in the `restore_tqb_pixels` function, an attacker controlled integer underflow can occur during the calculation of offsets for the `src` and `dst` operands of a `mempcy`. Because of the underflows, the resulting addresses passed to the `memcpy` are outside the bounds of the original heap structures, resulting in an out of bounds write condition. This vulnerability can be used to create a specially crafted BPG image file which results in remote code execution when opened with any application using a vulnerable version of the libbpg library.
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Discovered by Aleksandar Nikolic of Cisco Talos
Talos is disclosing TALOS-2016-0259 / CVE-2017-2791 an uninitialized memory vulnerability in Adobe Acrobat Reader DC. Adobe Acrobat Reader is one of the largest and well known PDF readers available today.
This particular vulnerability is associated with the JPEG Decoder functionality embedded in the application. A specially crafted PDF document containing a JPEG can be used to trigger this vulnerability which results in a heap-based buffer overflow which can be leveraged to achieve remote code execution. This issue has been resolved in the most recent patch provided by Adobe. The full details surrounding the vulnerability are available here.
The following Snort Rules will detect exploitation attempts. Note that additional rules may be released at a future date and current rules are subject to change pending additional vulnerability information. For the most current rule information, please refer to your FireSIGHT Management Center or Snort.org.
Snort Rule: 41298 – 41305
Locky has been a devastating force for the last year in the spam and ransomware landscape. The Locky variant of ransomware has been responsible for huge amounts of spam messages being sent on a daily basis. The main driver behind this traffic is the Necurs botnet. This botnet is responsible for the majority of Locky and Dridex activity. Periodically Necurs goes offline and during these periods we typically see Locky activity decrease drastically. One of these periods is currently ongoing.